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In the recent decades, the Fama–French three-factor (1992, 1993, 1996) and five-factor 
(2015) models become the most widely used asset pricing models in the world. The U.S. (i.e., 
developed financial market) country-specific 2 additional factors in the 5-factor model, RMW 
and CMA or profitability and investment premium, empirically cannot further capture the 
return variation of the classic three-factor/characteristic in China’s stock market (i.e., 
developing financial markets). In China, based on our result, therefore, the classic three-
factor outperforms the five-factor model. We do not presume that firms in different countries 
share the same features. Following Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2019), we replaced the price-
to-book ratio (PB) with the earnings-price ratio (EP). By using Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchange stocks, we suggested that the explanatory uncertainty of HML only exists in the 
five-factor model. In the Fama MacBeth regression, the SMB and HML are significant 
factors in the three-factor model, explaining the return variation in China. Surprisingly, 
though the size effect is impressively persistent in both models, the ratio effect has limited 
explanatory power. 
 
JEL Codes: C5, G1, G2 







What are the determinants of factor in explaining the expected stock return in nowadays? 
This is the researchers’ enduring question, and it is a prominent issue in the study of asset 
pricing. Banz (1981) proposed that there is a negative relation between average stock return 
and size (market capitalization), hence we predict that the smaller the firm, the higher the 
average return. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and Fama and French (1992) present the value 
effect, which we call the ratio effect: that stocks or firms with higher book-to-market (BM) or 
book-to-price (BP) ratios are more likely to have higher-than-average returns. At the year end 
of 2019, China’s total equity market capitalization, the world’s second largest, is around 
59.29 trillion China yuan; the U.S. stock market capitalization, in turn, is about $37.68 trillion 
U.S. dollars, nearly 300 trillion China yuan. Figure 1.1 presents the uptrend of Chinese 
published firms’ valuation, along with that of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A share class and 
Second-board markets. 
Figure 1.1 The Overview of China Stock Market, Dec. 1990 – Dec. 2018 
 
 
To some extent, the empirical experience of the stock market and relevant analysis of 
transaction or trading data enlarges and improves the asset pricing theory. In the last few 
decades, accordingly, researchers have not only focused on theoretical asset pricing but also 






strategies has motivated professionals to continuously investigate theoretical systems of 
pricing in order to push up the pricing efficiency of the capital market and enhance trading 
strategies.  
Jack Treynor (1961, 1962), William F. Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan 
Mossin (1966) independently purposed the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). However, 
CAMP’s single factor cannot satisfy the real and modern exchange market any longer. There 
are many frictional trading transactions, such as tax and other costs, in addition, the market 
portfolio is hard to be hold for diversifying out risk. CAPM should include more factors for 
explaining the real modern market. Ross (1976, 2013) first presented the Arbitrage Theory of 
Capital Asset Pricing (APT) in the multi-factor’s asset pricing liner-regression model. APT 
extends CAPM to multiple factors. Based on the framework of CAPM and APT, Fama and 
French first conclusively introduced the three and five-factor models in 1992, 1993 and 2015, 
respectively. Arbitrage pricing theory indicates that the behavior of arbitrage is a determining 
factor in the formation of modern efficient markets (market equilibrium pricing).  
Griffin (2002) supported the claim that there is no benefit to use the Fama and French 
three-factor model in a worldwide range. Fama and French (2012) analyzed the application of 
five-factor model in North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia Pacific. Except in Japan, they 
found the same conclusion that they had found before, in the U.S. Moreover, they found out 
the return momentum for all the countries except Japan. In addition, Fama and French (2016) 
found that in North America, Europe, and Asia Pacific, the expected returns positively related 
to B/M and negatively related to investment. However, their conclusion and expectation did 
not explain the Japanese market. Both three- and five-factor models have been the most 
famous and extensively used asset pricing (investment) models, whether theoretically or 
empirically.   
The localized factors or characteristics model has not received enough concern and 
development. Based on U.S. data, Fama and French created common factors to explain 
expected return anomalies. However, instead of creating another country-specific “factors or 
characteristics zoo,” our paper bases on the framework of the Fama–French three/five-factor 
model and Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan (2019), hereafter LSY (2019), and mainly focuses on 
the empirical performance of factor model in the China stock market. Moreover, the 
emerging China stock market is not the case of the developed U.S. equity market. Investors in 
the developing market are separate and youth player, compared to sophisticated investors in 
developed financial markets. Many papers found out the serious herding, lottery, and 
speculative participant in investment behavior. For example, uninformed investors are likely 
chasing hot and discarding cold. According to LSY (2019) and Lee, Qu, and Shen (2017), 
hereafter LQS (2017), pre-enrolled-IPO firms face an extremely long inspection process and 
high costs, therefore, these companies passby and purchase “nearly bankruptcy or bad 
performance public firm” – the common part of these firms is small size and low ratio – for 
achieving the indirect Initial Public Offering. We can see the indirect-IPO throughout the last 
20 years in China’s stock market. Until the end of 2013, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) implemented its IPO Standards in the Audit of Reverse Mergers for 






revised the previous acts and detailed the processes of the inspection. The typical 
outperformance of indirect-IPO firms is extremely obvious after a success onboard. In 
addition, the outperformance attracts entire market attention. The anomalies of indirect-IPO 
should be considered in the empirical asset pricing playfield. 
Based on the three-factor model, Fama and French (2015) provided the five-factor model, 
which included the profitability factor RMW and the investment factor CMA. They also 
confirmed the validity of the five-factor model with more than 50 years of U.S. market data. 
However, Zhao et al. (2016) indicate that the Chinese stock market rejects RMW and CMA 
due to their table evidence of coefficients of RMW and CMA. Hu et al. (2019), our evidence 
consistent with their paper is that the size effect has a huge weight in explaining the average 
return. However, our paper differed from the existing literature in its use of the ratio of EP, 
which outperforms BM in explaining average returns. Our paper considers the indirect-IPO to 
decline the possibility of mispricing. Therefore, according to LQS (2017) and LYS (2019), 
we have followed the step that 30% of small size stocks in each period are eliminated as a 
corrective for related potential mispricing.  
We contribute to the existing literature in several aspects. First, we investigated the 
models’ adoption by using Chinese stock market data and found that the three-factor model is 
more applicable than the five-factor. Second, this question of adoption rarely has been asked 
in the literature, more specifically, by using China stock market, we investigate this model 
adoption issue. Third, the evidence suggests that the asset pricing theory in the field of factor 
























2. Literature review 
In the 1960s, Jack Treynor (1961, 1962), William F. Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965), 
and Jan Mossin (1966) independently purposed CAPM. Since then, the model has developed 
rapidly. Fama and MacBeth (1973), for example, used the cross-section regression method to 
further test the CAPM model empirically. 
 However, CAPM is a single-factor model interpreting stock return in market risk 
premium (market retune minus risk free rate). It does not incorporate listed companies’ 
features and characteristics—size effect, book-to-market ratio (Fama and French 1992, 1993, 
1996), momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), and liquidity factor (Pástor and 
Stambaugh, 2003). In addition, Banz et al. (1981) and Stattman (1980) found that in the US 
market, there are two famous factors, the firm capitalization (market cap or size effect) and 
book to market ratio (BM or ratio effect). Fama and French (1993) combined the CAPM, size 
and BM together, purpose an asset pricing model in three factors: market risk premium, size 
effect, and book-to-market ratio. It is their classic 1993 paper that directed researchers’ focus 
to empirical asset pricing model. 
Based on the FF three-factor model, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
further incorporates the momentum factor and claims the four-factor model. In the most 
recent, the authors of three-factor model, Fama and French (2015), purpose the five-factors 
model by adding in the profitability factor (RMW) and the investment factor (CMA). By 
using China stock market data, our paper mainly investigates an adoption issue that the model 
equally explains China stock return in both 3 and 5 factors. Namely, which model is more 
adaptive (FF3 or FF5)? There are many significant differences between the US and China 
stock markets, for example, the way of regulation, the mechanism of initial public offering 
and stock delisting, the report of financial statement and so on. FF3 and FF5 are country-
specific three- and five-factor model, respectively. It is necessary to fit China-specific data in 
the FF model framework to see the difference. However, we barely see the paper in this area. 
According to our empirical result, the FF3 outperforms the FF5 in China.  
Fama and French applies BM to sort stock portfolios, but in this article, we replace it 
with the reciprocal of EP. According to Liu, Stambaugh and Yuan, LSY (2019), the evidence 
strongly supports the approval of EP ratio because of advanced model explanation in most 
reported anomalies. As we know, the size effect is embodied by BM and the ratio effect is 
reflected by EP in FF papers. In addition, the “B” accounts for the book value; “M” 
represents the firm’s market value; E stands for earning per share and P is the stock price. 
According to Fama and French (1996) and professor Kenneth R. French’s website: SMB 
(Small Minus Big) is the average return on small portfolios minus the average return on big 
portfolios, while HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on high EP portfolios minus 
the average return on low EP portfolios. In 1992 Fama and French issued a paper that 
elaborated on the common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Their evidence 
clearly points out that three factors affect the average return on stocks, the overall market 






factor model solves problems that CAPM cannot fix.  
In addition, some papers point out the models’ acclimatized issues in many countries. 
Unfortunately, the model cannot solve anomalies across all countries (see, Griffin (2002), 
Fama and French (2012), Fama and French (2016), LSY (2019)). The three-factor model 
holds the outperformance in China. The reason of the five-factor model underperformance 
could be complex. However, we know that there are many differences in the US and Chinese 
stock markets. For capturing the expected excess return, firm features that based on U.S. 
market may not equally explain the China stocks. Moreover, we know not only that the size 
effect and ratio effect work well but also that, for the left-hand side variable, expected excess 
return, the size effect holds persistent explanatory power. According to Lee, Qu, and Shen 
(2017), LQS (2017), there is a unique spot in China stock market, that is, the longtime and 
tight IPO processes cause a bypass, so called indirect-IPO. Unlike the US stock market, the 
Chinese stock market, was established 30 years ago, in 1990s. It is developing rapidly since 
2006. Some researchers have confirmed the size effect and ratio effect; others, however, have 
not. Stock trading in emerging markets is fraught with speculation, opaque information 
disclosure, information distortion, and other market-specific characteristics. The factor model 
is based on features inherent in developed capital markets. Thus, the investigation in model 
adoption becomes an urgent topic in China capital market. We find limited papers focused on 
the three- or five-factors model in specific China.  
Because of Fama and French (2015), investment and profit factors become famous 
characteristics in the asset pricing playfield. The current research on the company's 
profitability and investment level become the main direction of the asset pricing model, but 
research on emerging markets combined with profitability and investment factor is still rare, 
especially in China’s stock market.  
Therefore, this article bases on the factor pricing model to study whether the profitability 
and investment factors in the Chinese stock market can equally explain average return. By 
using China data, we follow the exact same way to create the CMA and RMW. The role of 
the factor pricing model varies from market to market; this paper complements existing 
research in this area. 
In the rest of article, the data section is in the next chapter, and then we sort the China 
listed stocks using methodology of Fama and French (1994, 1995, 2015). In the methodology 
section, the three-factor model is adapted to China A-class and small-medium share stock 











3. Data and Methodology 
We use the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database and 
investigate the adoption of the factor models. Our analysis includes monthly stock return and 
considers monthly cash dividend reinvestment (the accounting regulation and definition are 
obviously differently). The frequency of return is monthly. Risk-free rate is the three-month 
fixed-time deposited rate and the quarterly financial reports (the most of researchers in China 
consider the three-month fixed-time deposited rate as the risk-free rate). The full sample is 
the period beginning January 2003 and ending December 2018. Because the classic 
methodology required value-weighted stock return (VWRET) data to construct the portfolios, 
we then compute it by monthly frequency. We have three main markets: first, the A-Class 
shares of the Shanghai stock exchange; second, the A-class shares of the Shenzhen stock 
exchange; and third, the Second Board Market.   
The regression methodology is time-series regression, or “Fama and French regression.” 
Fama and French (1996, 2015) applied the same methodology in their paper. The cross-
sectional loadings, 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 , ℎ𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖, are estimated from equation 1 and 2, three and 
five factor model respectively. The monthly value-weighted return on mimicking size and 
other explanatory independent variables showing on the right-hand side. According to 
LSY(2019) and LQS (2017), there are several filters for processing data (a) Stocks within 15 
days in the previous month or that have less than 120 days in the last year are dropped for 
decreasing the targets of potential indirect-IPO. LSY (2019) indicated that the rank of bottom 
30% market-cap should be deleted to sidestep step the potential indirect-IPO. (b) The poorly 
performance firms are eliminated for the same reason, such as the prefix contained *S and 
PT. (c) Financial firms were excluded. (d) We smooth the 1% on each tail. (e) we use A Class 
share from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges to form the story, such as, the first 
two digits “00” “60” and “30.” (f) According to Zhao el al. (2016), the date before 2003 is 
quite noisy. Therefore, the start date is January 2003, and the end date is December 2018; the 
maximum period is 192 months. The total number of companies in December 2018 is 
approximately 3800; after all the requirements, our sample contains around 2400 firms and 
290,000 observations.    
Regression model: 
𝑅it − 𝑅Ft = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅Mt − 𝑅Ft) + 𝑠𝑖SMB𝑡 + ℎ𝑖HML𝑡 + 𝑒it                   (1) 
𝑅it − 𝑅Ft = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅Mt − 𝑅Ft) + 𝑠𝑖SMB𝑡 + ℎ𝑖HML𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖RMW𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖CMA𝑡 + 𝑒it (2) 
Rit, the return of the portfolio “i” on time t, RFt is the risk-free rate, therefore, the LHS is 
the excess return. RMt is the monthly value weighted market return, so, the excess return is 
difference between the value weighted market return and risk free rate; SMB (small mines 
big) is the diversified return difference between the low market-cap portfolio and the high 
market-cap portfolio (market-value equals to the total share times the stock price) on time t, 






price-to-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) portfolio and the low reciprocal of price-to-earnings ratio 
(P/E ratio) portfolio on time t, 𝑒it is the zero-mean residual. Monthly Value-weighted was 
calculated for constructing S/L, S/N, SH, B/L, B/N and B/H and these components formed 
SMB and HML. For ranking the excess portfolio return, we use the same method and cut the 
EP and size into 5 groups (1 stands for smallest and 5 stands for biggest) respectively, thus, 
intersectional 25 monthly value-weighted portfolios formed the whole picture. On the second 
equation, according to Fama and French (2015), RMW𝑡 (robust mines weak) is the 
diversified return difference between the robust profitability portfolio and weak profitability 
portfolio. Because of the difference in accounting regulation, we calculate the profitability by 
using revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus selling, general, and administrative expenses, 
minus interest expense all divided by book equity. CMA𝑡 (conservative mines aggressive) is 
the diversified return difference between the conservative profitability portfolio and 
aggressive profitability portfolio. To measure the investment level, we use ratio of the change 
in total assets from the fiscal year ending in year t-2 to the fiscal year ending in t-1, divided 
by t-2 total assets.  
Figure 3.2 The Factor Construction  
five-factor construction 
Sort Breakpoint Construction 
Size and E/P, or 
Size and OP, or 
Size and Inv 
Size: median  
E/P: 30th and 70th 
OP: 30th and 70th 
Inv: 30th and 70th  
On percentiles 
SMBE/P = (SL+SN+SH)/3 – (BL+BN+BH)/3 
SMBop = (SR+SN+SW)/3 – (BR+BN+BW)/3 
SMBInv = (SC+SN+SA)/3 – (BC+BN+BA)/3 
thus, 
SMB = (SMBE/P + SMBop + SMBInv)/3 
HML=(SH+BH)/2 – (SL+BL)/2 
RMW=(SR +BR)/2 – (SW+BW)/2 
CMA=(SC+BC)/2 – (SA+BA)/2 
three-factor construction 
Sort Breakpoint Construction 
Size and E/P 
 
Size: median  
E/P: 30th and 70th 
SMB=(SL+SN+SH)/3 – (BL+BN+BH)/2 
HML=(SH+BH)/2 – (SL+BL)/2 
In summary, if the model performs protectively well, the expected return can be fully 
captured by 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 , ℎ𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖. Thus, the R-squares must be high, and the pricing error 
must be low, while all the intercepts must be statistically insignificant.  However, the level 
of market efficiency and self-regulation can be a very important precondition for explaining 
anomalies. The grafting model is questionable; it is necessary to develop the unique version 
of China’s stock market.  
In fact, both accounting and regulation are very different between USA and China. Factor 
consideration/filtration do impact on the result. Based on the Chinese listed companies, some 






that BM is unexplanatory and replaced it, for example, with PB when they analyze the three-
factor model in many China research paper. One of a major school use the reciprocal of PB as 
a substitution for BM. However, Liu, Stambaugh and Yuan (2019) supportive proved the 
performance of earning to price ratio (EP) by using China stock market data. 
There are three main types of separation used in constructing the five-factor model (2X3, 





























4. The empirical results 
By size, value, and other factors, we sorted the stocks into 25 portfolios. The difference 
between low ratios and high ratios represents the incremental level of earning to pricing ratio. 
The difference between small and big size represents the incremental level of firms’ market 
capitalization (total share outstanding times the month end price). We run the time-series 
regression for estimating the loading in each return portfolio, for instance, the intercept/α, 
coefficients of market premium/Coff. RP, size premium/Coff. SMB and value premium/Coff. 
HML. t(α), t(RP)，t(SMB) and t(HML) are the corresponding t-statistics, respectively. 
Residuals are the time-series regression of each 25 portfolio. On another side of coin, we 
focus on the coefficients of investment premium/Coff. CMA, profitability premium/Coff. 
RMW. t(CMA) and t(RMW) are the corresponding t-statistics, respectively. 
Table 4.1 shows the coefficients on 25 portfolios of value-weighted stocks. According to 
Fama and French (1996), the small-sized firms are more likely to have higher returns than the 
large-sized firms, while the high-ratio stocks are more likely to have higher returns than the 
low-ratio stocks. Our sample supports this same pattern. 
Table 4.1 The Empirical Result of Three Factor Model 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the stock return on portfolio-based return i for month t, 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the three-month deposit rate, 𝑅𝑀𝑡 is the 
return on value weight market portfolio; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is a diversified return on portfolio of the difference between small 
stocks and big stocks on month t. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the diversified return on portfolio of the different between high ratio 
firms and low ratio firms. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the potential zero-mean residual. In June of each year, we firstly separate list 
firms into 2 groups (small or big, S or B) by median market capitalization (total shares outstanding times the 
month end stock price) and reform the rank in June of year t+1. Based on EP, the earning to price ratio, in the 
year of t -1, we then separate list firms into 3 segments by 30th and 70th quintiles, so, we have the low ratio(L), 
middle ratio (N)and high ratio groups(H).  
Thus, we intersectional hold 6 grouped value-weighted return portfolios, such as, SL, SN, SH, BL, BN and BH, to 
construct SMB and HML at each time t. In the whole paper, monthly value weighted returns were calculated in 
each portfolio. The market risk premium was the difference between value weighted market return and three month 





Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small -0.0342 -0.0239 -0.0116 -0.0098 -0.0125 Small -2.79 -1.90 -0.85 -0.70 -0.91 
2 -0.0204 -0.0177 -0.0035 -0.0049 -0.0065 2 -1.83 -1.54 -0.30 -0.51 -0.82 
3 -0.0088 -0.0025 0.0110 0.0115 0.0053 3 -1.09 -0.29 1.33 1.29 0.86 
4 0.0030 0.0019 0.0114 0.0074 0.0116 4 0.31 0.26 1.33 0.85 1.92 
Big Size -0.0109 -0.0173 -0.0107 -0.0100 0.0046 Big -1.72 -3.63 -1.64 -2.08 0.75 
Coff. RP t(RP) 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small 0.768 0.812 0.874 0.882 0.874 Small Size 15.21 16.10 17.38 17.46 16.88 







2 0.850 0.864 0.937 0.909 0.917 2 20.05 18.29 21.00 23.33 28.23 
3 0.921 0.944 0.993 1.015 0.979 3 28.63 25.06 31.50 29.52 40.60 
4 0.988 0.971 1.009 0.989 1.011 4 26.32 34.77 28.41 31.07 45.70 
Big 0.926 0.886 0.922 0.918 0.993 Big 26.34 29.92 30.89 44.38 34.52 
Coff. SMB t(SMB) 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small 0.498 0.508 0.487 0.473 0.344 Small 8.88 8.27 7.37 7.52 5.82 
2 0.488 0.580 0.519 0.434 0.349 2 7.91 9.64 8.25 7.03 9.75 
3 0.300 0.338 0.307 0.311 0.183 3 3.35 5.85 5.26 6.76 3.32 
4 -0.065 -0.013 0.021 -0.029 -0.047 4 -1.35 -0.40 0.52 -0.60 -2.05 
Big -0.147 -0.095 -0.032 -0.068 -0.076 Big -4.32 -2.78 -0.92 -2.56 -1.67 
Coff. HML t(HML) 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small -0.396 -0.329 -0.168 -0.005 0.144 Small -8.69 -5.57 -4.29 -0.11 5.44 
2 -0.400 -0.355 -0.119 0.079 0.155 2 -6.88 -5.20 -5.49 4.43 5.73 
3 -0.335 -0.277 -0.082 0.047 0.119 3 -8.67 -6.51 -4.81 2.88 6.00 
4 -0.289 -0.224 -0.058 0.016 0.096 4 -7.69 -9.05 -2.98 0.83 4.75 
Big -0.136 -0.132 -0.044 0.005 0.073 Big -2.79 -2.25 -2.69 0.31 3.41 
R square (Time-series regression) Residual 【stander deviation】 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
 
Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small Size 84% 85% 85% 83% 84% Small Size 4.96% 5.07% 4.98% 5.38% 5.25% 
2 85% 86% 87% 86% 90% 2 5.32% 4.97% 4.61% 4.64% 4.05% 
3 87% 86% 86% 88% 90% 3 4.79% 4.68% 4.37% 4.05% 3.73% 
4 86% 86% 86% 83% 91% 4 5.09% 4.61% 4.62% 4.81% 3.50% 
Big Size 80% 88% 88% 91% 92% Big Size 5.46% 4.00% 3.84% 3.28% 3.24% 
Table 4.1 presents the estimated loadings of three factor in time-series regression. 
Unsurprisingly, we find out that almost all of the intercepts are insignificant expect for the 
portfolio of stocks in the smallest size and lowest EP section, that almost all of the t statistics 
of SMB and HML are significant, and that, thus, these two factors provide significant 
explanatory power for the left-hand side variable, average excess return. LSY (2019) propose 
that EP performs better in capturing the anomalies of the Chinese stock market, in addition, 
LQS (2017) point out that the indirect-IPO leaves arouses substantial noise in the market. 
Therefore, we follow the methodology of LSY (2019) and eliminate the bottom 30% of small 
market-cap firms to reduce to this noise.  
Table 4.2 the Empirical Result of Five Factor Model 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the stock return on portfolio-based return i for month t, 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the three-month deposit rate, 𝑅𝑀𝑡 is the 
return on value weight market portfolio; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is a diversified return on portfolio of the difference between small 
stocks and big stocks on month t. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the diversified return on portfolio of the different between high ratio 
firms and low ratio firms. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the residual. In June of year t, we firstly separate list firms into 2 groups (small 
or big, S or B) by median market capitalization (total shares outstanding times the month end stock price) and 






list firms into 3 segments by 30th and 70th quintiles, we have the low ratio(L), middle ratio (N)and high ratio 
groups(H). Thus, we intersectional have 6 grouped portfolios, such as, SL, SN, SH, BL, BN and BH, to construct 
SMB and HML. In the whole paper, monthly value weighted returns were calculated in each portfolio. The market 
risk premium was the difference between value weighted market return and three month fixed deposited rate.  
We use the profitability (revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus selling, operating, and administrative expenses, 
minus account expense all divided by book equity) in end of year t-1 to divide sample into 3 groups by 30th (Robust) 
and 70th (Weak) percentiles. Based on the change ratios in the last two years, the investment was calculated by 
the total asset change ratio, then we separate them into 3 groups by 30th (Conservative) and 70th (Aggressive) 
percentiles. Again, we intersectional have 6 portfolios by size (2 groups) and profitability (3 groups), and 6 group 
portfolios by size (2 groups) and investment (3 groups). Then, we have the RMW (Robust Minus Weak) and CMA 
(Conservative Minus Aggressive) 
We use the same methodology to construct 25 portfolios by size (5 groups) and EP (5 groups) at each month. 
α   t(α) 
  Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio   Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small  0.0056 0.0075 0.0082 0.0059 0.0078 Small  1.13 1.47 1.44 1.16 1.88 
2 0.0068 0.0087 0.0055 0.0094 0.0084 2 1.31 1.44 1.22 2.18 2.55 
3 0.0101 0.0096 0.0124 0.0084 0.0101 3 1.95 2.13 3.23 2.28 3.34 
4 0.0099 0.0099 0.0099 0.0093 0.0103 4 2.28 2.17 2.46 2.16 4.26 
Big Size 0.0021 0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0013 0.0029 Big  0.87 0.31 -0.46 -0.45 1.64 
Coff. HML t(H) 
  Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio   Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small  -0.179 -0.215 -0.025 0.060 0.200 Small Size  -6.06 -5.21 -1.32 1.08 4.61 
2 -0.174 -0.187 0.010 0.094 0.138 2 -3.91 -4.26 0.21 3.29 5.33 
3 -0.163 -0.133 -0.041 0.017 0.060 3 -4.07 -3.51 -1.79 0.85 2.12 
4 -0.095 -0.146 -0.046 0.001 0.063 4 -1.61 -7.72 -3.70 0.04 1.85 
Big -0.085 -0.162 -0.059 0.020 0.026 Big  -1.31 -3.54 -2.68 1.60 1.09 
Coff. RMW t(R) 
  Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio   Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small  -0.040 -0.050 -0.092 0.001 -0.025 Small  -2.01 -3.68 -4.66 0.05 -2.05 
2 -0.079 -0.029 -0.090 -0.059 -0.007 2 -3.56 -2.23 -4.07 -5.65 -1.69 
3 -0.080 -0.035 -0.051 -0.058 -0.018 3 -5.83 -3.54 -3.06 -3.68 -1.48 
4 -0.042 -0.051 -0.086 -0.065 -0.011 4 -3.82 -3.02 -6.96 -2.95 -1.37 
Big  -0.033 -0.054 -0.046 -0.025 0.052 Big -0.82 -4.10 -4.12 -2.91 4.21 
Coff. CMA t(c) 
  Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio   Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small  0.038 -0.016 -0.172 -0.206 -0.070 Small  1.18 -0.71 -5.27 -3.92 -1.72 
2 0.016 -0.051 -0.122 -0.112 -0.094 2 0.25 -3.01 -4.79 -2.93 -5.37 
3 0.108 -0.023 -0.061 -0.076 -0.024 3 2.26 -1.80 -3.25 -4.92 -1.66 
4 -0.019 -0.041 -0.084 -0.123 -0.057 4 -0.52 -1.64 -2.74 -3.23 -2.52 
Big  0.088 -0.018 -0.126 -0.078 0.083 Big 3.91 -0.80 -4.30 -2.86 4.73 
 







Coff. SMB t(s) 
  Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio   Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small  0.728 0.714 0.671 0.743 0.505 Small  8.92 8.09 6.69 8.79 6.61 
2 0.663 0.752 0.599 0.535 0.448 2 8.00 8.03 8.00 6.10 11.48 
3 0.502 0.464 0.394 0.337 0.245 3 4.35 6.22 5.19 6.63 3.67 
4 0.097 0.119 0.095 0.034 -0.022 4 1.31 3.65 3.25 0.73 -1.10 
Big  -0.182 -0.164 -0.241 -0.308 -0.207 Big -3.20 -5.38 -6.15 -5.53 -5.50 
Coff. RP T(RP) 
  Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio   Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small Size  0.668 0.701 0.740 0.659 0.734 Small Size  9.99 8.75 8.84 9.16 12.99 
2 0.870 0.875 0.891 0.841 0.876 2 14.64 9.18 13.97 14.08 21.79 
3 1.066 1.049 1.015 1.026 1.015 3 17.92 18.98 29.14 27.12 26.29 
4 1.172 1.079 1.044 1.014 1.045 4 26.75 33.62 21.46 22.84 34.68 
Big Size 0.945 0.832 0.720 0.688 0.881 Big Size 17.40 21.77 14.65 15.96 29.96 
R square (Fama - French regression) Residual 【stander deviation】 
  Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio   Low Ratio 2 3 4 High Ratio 
Small Size  80% 81% 82% 80% 82% Small Size  5.00% 5.03% 4.88% 5.01% 4.74% 
2 81% 80% 84% 84% 87% 2 5.11% 5.35% 4.48% 4.32% 4.05% 
3 81% 82% 83% 84% 87% 3 5.12% 4.67% 4.29% 4.10% 3.62% 
4 80% 81% 81% 77% 88% 4 5.37% 4.68% 4.57% 4.84% 3.38% 
Big Size 72% 82% 84% 87% 89% Big Size 6.00% 4.16% 3.66% 3.18% 3.09% 
The comparison between the three and five factor model indicates that the empirical 
evidence supports the outromance of three factor model instead of five factor model. The 
insignificant intercepts in FF3 (EP instead of BM) obviously dominate the insignificant 
intercepts in FF5, while in FF3 the average R-square is nearly 87% and the average standard 
deviation of residuals is around 4.5%. However, there are 11 significant intercepts in FF5 (EP 
instead of BM), and the average R-square in FF5 is almost 4% lower than the average R-
square of FF3. The average of residuals is around 4.5%. Empirically, therefore, we support 
that the performance of FF3 is better than that of FF5. The difference of China and U.S. stock 
market is a possible explanation in the gap between FF3 and FF5, investment and 
profitability premium are constructed by the common features of public companies, in 
addition, China individuals normally focus on the underestimated stock in equity market 
instead of looking for potential growth target, thus the investment and profitability could be 
automatically omitted. Investors significantly focus on short term return or fast money, for 
example, it is very common to see that individuals chase the hottest one and discard the 
coldest stock in order to harvest benefit. Moreover, the system of information disclosure is 
not as developed as the system in U.S., investor do not put too much weight on evaluating 
financial statement. The huge gap between informed and uninformed investor directs the 
herding movement obviously.   
CMA and RMW, two additional factors in FF3, cannot fit in the emerging China stock 
market. On the opposite, the revised classic Fama and French three-factor model constructed 






Our findings, finally, are inconsistent with papers that the FF5 is better than the FF3 in U.S. 








































5. Fama and MacBeth Regression 
According to Fama and French (1993), in each June, we separated the firms’ market 
capitalization into six equal-sized groups. We applied the individual stock’s exposures to the 
market factor (MRK), size effect (SMB) and ratio effect (HML) for the pre-ranking betas. 
The pre-ranking betas are estimated from the previous 24 to 36 month’s returns. Because of 
the high correlation between the size and size-betas, Fama and French (1993) point out that 
the problem of using size and size-betas is high correlation issue. To account for this problem, 
then, in the basis of pre-ranking CAPM betas, we sub-separated the six size groups into six 
more group, thus we have 36 portfolios which is sorted by the intersection between betas and 
size. Hu et al. (2019) utilities similar method but different problem. Moreover, we calculated 
the portfolios’ monthly return for the next 15 months, starting in July of each year. Then, the 
post-ranking betas (full sample) are estimated by the calculated monthly return on 36 
portfolios constructed on size and CAPM betas, MRK, SMB and HML. In the second pass of 
the Fama and MacBeth regression, we used post-ranking betas on each factor to estimate the 
exposures. 
Table 5.3 The Fama MacBeth Regression for Three Factor 
In the first step of Fama MacBeth regression, by past 36 (min 24) months, we estimate pre-ranking betas for 
individual stocks. 36 intersections between size and CAMP betas portfolios were formed for estimating post-
ranking betas. We calculated the monthly returns on portfolios for the next 15 months, then we have post-ranking 
average return on 36 portfolios formed on size and pre-ranking CAMP betas. Finally, we use full sample period 
to estimate post-ranking betas by all the value weighted portfolios of stocks. In the end, these betas were used in 
the second step of Fama MacBeth cross-sectional regression in each time point for individual stocks. Note: the 
MRK, SMB and HML are the coefficients of independent variable. For example, SMB in this table represent the 
coefficient of size effect. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  ALL SMB+HML SMB+MRK HML+MRK MRK 
MRK -0.014    -0.011  -0.001  0.007  
 (-0.62)  (-0.47) (-0.01) -0.360  
SMB -0.029* -0.027* -0.034*   
 (-2.03) (-2.31) (-2.33)   
HML 0.044* 0.044*  0.053**  
 2.540 2.520  2.960  
cons -0.004  -0.005  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005  
  (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.67) (-0.69) 
r2 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.002 
t statistics in  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Parentheses 
 *** p<0.001 
    







We compute exposures in Fama MacBeth regression. These estimates are provided   to 
filter out which independent variable has non-zero expected premiums. In Table 5.3, we can 
clearly see all the time series average of coefficients of month by month cross-sectional 
regression on size, beta, and other factors. The size and ratio play a consistently important 
role in explaining the average stock returns. The persistent negative (positive) sign and 
significant level on SMB (HML) form models 1 to 4 is supportive evidence that the size and 
value effect explain cross-sectional average stock returns significantly.  
In Table 5.4, however, in the Fama and French five-factor model, the uncertain positive 
significant number on HML supports that the explanatory power of the ratio effect is not as 
pronounced as that of the size effect. Thus, in five model, our empirical evidence implies that 
the size effect acts the most meaningful explanatory power for the returns. This uncertainty of 
the ratio effect’s explanatory power reflects the unique Chinese stock market, which is the 
reason it is necessary to develop a country-specific asset pricing model even as we consider 
the indirect-IPO. The consistent insignificant coefficients, CMA and RMW, reject that the 
investment and profitability factor can equally explain China stock return, moreover, this 
evidence reinforces our empirical findings in table 4.1 and 4.2 that the FF3 is better than the 
FF5.  
Table 5.4 The Fama MacBeth Regression for Five Factor 
In the first stage of Fama MacBeth regression, we separate sample into 6 groups by size (total share outstanding 
times monthly end stock price) on each June. The pre-ranking CAMP-bests were estimated by using the individual 
stocks and all value-weighted return portfolios and by past 36 (min 24) months. Then, we further separate each 
of the six-size group into 6 groups by using the pre-ranking CAMP-bests, thus we have 36 portfolios formed by 
size and CAMP-betas. We compute the equal-weighted return (post-ranking) on stock portfolios and run full 
sample (2003 - 2018) regression on market and other proxies for post-ranking betas. Note: the MRK, SMB, HML, 
CMA and RMW are the coefficients of independent variable. For example, HML in this table represent the 
coefficient of value effect. 
In the second stage of Fama MacBeth regression, we cross-sectional estimate the time series average post-ranking 
betas on each of the time period.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 ALL S+R+C H+R+C R+C S+H S H 
MRK 0.007  0.004  0.004  0.002  -0.019  -0.024  -0.022  
 0.400 0.230 0.230 0.100 (-0.81) (-1.02) (-0.96) 
SMB -0.037** -0.034*   -0.036* -0.032*  
 (-2.69) (-2.54)   (-2.51) (-2.41)  
HML 0.031*  0.024   0.031*  0.024  
 2.130  1.730  2.040  1.700 
RMW -0.023  -0.018  -0.027  -0.022     
 (-1.66) (-1.27) (-1.88) (-1.53)    
CMA -0.033  -0.036  -0.031  -0.034     
 (-1.84) (-1.95) (-1.69) (-1.82)    






cons -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002  -0.004  
 (-0.40) (-0.36) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.35) (-0.31) (-0.47) 
        
r2 0.015  0.012  0.012  0.010  0.010  0.007  0.007  
t statistics in parentheses             
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001             
In the empirical results, we found that the size effect has the strongest performance for 
both three- and five-factor models. It is surprising low that the difference between R-square 
of two factor (MRK and SMB) and R-square of three factors (MRK, SMB and HML), more 
specifically, this difference is around 5%. Table 5.4 provides the evidence to suggest that 
investment and profitability do not contribute to explain the average return. However, the 
HML, formed with EP, also does not provide persistent explanatory power. 
In summary, the empirical result in table 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that the 3-factor model is 
better than the five model. Moreover, the evidence in table 5.3 and 5.4 enhance the empirical 
result. In table 5.4, one fact of insignificant coefficient in model 3 and 7 implies the 
uncertainty of EP ratio. However, no matter in 3 or 5 factor model, the size effect is 
consistently significant. Both empirical result and Fama MacBeth regression, none of 



























Many researches have investigated the Fama and French three- and five-factors models in 
developed markets, like G7 countries. However, we found limited studies that focused on the 
same issue in emerging markets, especially in China’s stock market. By using the earnings-
to-price ratio (EP) instead of book-to-market ratio (BM) (see, Liu, Stambaugh, and Yuan 
(2019) and Lee, Qu, and Shen (2017)), we find out that the performance of the three-factor 
model empirically precede the five-factor model and our FF3 (revised classic FF3 because of 
application of EP ratio) model do provide better performance in explaining average return, 
also, in the tradition Fama MacBeth regression, the result strengthen the empirical findings. 
Consistent with Zhao, Yan, and Zhang (2016), the performance of both the RMW and CMA 
is neglectable.  
As our results supported, because of features of emerging market, the localized multi-
factors model needs to be developed in order to, in particular, fulfill the blank of China’s 
asset pricing field. Different stock markets have different feature and common, we may not 
use one rule to measure market difference. Moreover, in the five-factor model, the HML is an 
uncertain factor in China stock market. Also, this finding is consistent with other group of 
Chinese researchers.  
Further studies may focus on the common factors of Chinese public companies. We see 
the feature of high volatility in Chinese stock market at short period of time, this is, it is easy 
to see the same positive and negative movement, again due to the supportive policy design, 
we may also see the abnormal benefits in stock market.. Thus, this homogenous movement 
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We analyze Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) managed 4273 loan sales 
transactions between 1994 and 2019 that include two major financial crises of the modern 
times: the dot.com bubble of 2001, and the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. We find 
that loan sales discounts, asset quality, industry classifications, compositions and buyers 
interest vary significantly during financial recessions and non-recessionary periods. Industry 
classifications affect loan sales discount rates. Loan sales discounts are inversely related with 
asset quality. While the non-performing and lower quality loans are sold at higher discounts, 
the sub-performing and the performing loans are sold at lower discount. Our evidences 
backup Demsetz’ s (2000) hypotheses that banks with limited branches and high reputation 
are more likely participate in the secondary market in order to erode the loan origination 
problem and diversify the current loan portfolio.  
JEL Codes: G210, G280 
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In the last several decades, sophisticated investor has locked considerable returns from 
the transaction of distressed real estate asset from underperforming banks. In a similar way, 
the FDIC-involved secondary market of loan sale provides a playfield in which seller banks 
sell out loans and buyer banks take in assets. Asset securitization and loan sales are two 
commonly used financing tools that the banks and financial institutions use to generate 
additional short-term fund from their long-term loan portfolios. During favorable economic 
situations, banks prefer to asset securitizations as the financial market has appetite for asset-
backed-securities (ABS). However, during an unfavorable economic situation, banks and 
their investment banks find difficult to raise capital by issuing ABS, and loan sales 
transactions provide better way to generate capital. Both asset securitization and loan sales 
allow the issuing or selling bank to transfer the risks of the loan portfolio to the buying bank. 
Loan sales are generally sold at a discounted price and for the purchasing banks, loan sales 
provide excellent investment opportunity (Smith and Hall, 2010).  
For bidders (prequalified banks), distress loan-sales originating from the underperformed 
banks are even more lucrative as the selling banks are more likely to accept a higher discount 
in selling their assets to generate capital. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
has provided the opportunity for buying and selling failed-banks’ loan since 1990s. In the 
early stage, limited products were sold on the market, nowadays, according to our paper, in 
the last three decades FDIC has arranged 4273 loan sales transactions, for example, multiple 
loan-qualities (such as Mixed, Non-Performing, between Perform and Non Performing, 
Performing, and Sub-Performing) and various loan-classifications (such as Bank Charge-Off, 
Commercial, Consumer,  Deficiency Bal, Installment, Judgment, Mixed, ORE Participation, 
Other, Real Estate Backed Commercial,  Real Estate Backed Residential, Student).  
Existing literature on loan sales provide various insights to implications of loan sales in 
terms of bank risk taking, bank performance, and corporate governance. Pennacchi (1988) 
provides theoretical explanations on how loan sales can provide a lower cost of financing 
loans for the selling banks in a competitive deposit market.  Becketti and Morris (1987) 
analyze the increased interest in loans sales during late 1980’s when Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA) initiated selling loan portfolios, that followed by banks 
selling various types of loan portfolios: their automobile loans, credit card and lease 
receivables, agricultural loans, etc. Becketti and Morris (1987) find that loan sales can 
enhance smoother functioning of short-term credit market. Demsetz (1993) finds that banks 
engage in loan sales transactions and loan syndications for several purposes: a) Leverage 
(acquisitions, Leverage Buyout LBO, recapitalization), b) Debt repayment, c) Specialty 
finance, and d) General Purposes. Demsetz (1993) shows that economic conditions play 
critical role in loan sales market. Loan sales by second-tier banks peaked from 1986 through 
the recessions in 1993; but during recessionary period, commercial and industrial loan sale 
origination declines for both second tier and first-tier banks. Weakness in borrowing 






post financial crisis period. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) argue that if the selling bank gives 
no guarantees on loan sales, the share of loan sold is inversely affected by the spread between 
loan sales yield and the LIBOR. 
Although, loan sale is a well-researched topic in banking literature, there is a caveat in 
loan sales research. Existing loan sale literature seldom provides any empirical evidence on 
the failed bank loan sales transactions. We contribute to the existing body of loan sales 
literature as one of the early papers to analyze the FDIC structured loan transactions. When 
an FDIC insured bank fails, the FDIC works as an intermediary and it conducts due diligence 
on the failed bank asset portfolio and make the available for sales to suitable investors, in 
addition, the purchasing banks can do the due diligence prior to the formal transaction. FDIC 
failed bank loan sales dataset consists of a total of 4273 loan sales transactions beginning 
from 1994 to 2019. The dataset also includes two financial crises of the recent times, the 
dot.com bubble of 2001, and the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, therefore, we claim 
that the discounted rate is extremely high in the crisis period. Although the FDIC channels 
out the loan sales from the failed banks, it does not provide any guarantee on the asset quality 
of the loan sales. Suitors or interested investors are provided opportunity to make their own 
judgement prior to the loan sale process. So, the asset quality of the loan sales remains a 
black box process, and investors are basically buying these loan sales based on their 
perceived asset quality. 
We contribute to the existing loan sales literature by several important ways. First, we 
analyze whether the industry classification determine discount rates of the loan sales 
contracts. Second, we investigate asset quality definitions disclosed by FDIC database affect 
the loan sales discounts. Third, we analyze the impact of crisis period in discounted loan 
price. Fourth, we explore what factors affect the loan price. Fifth, we provide supportive 
evidences to comparative, diversification and reputation hypotheses and claim that banks 
with limited branches and high reputation are more likely participate in the secondary market 






















9. Literature Review 
Existing papers on loan sales focus on primary loan sales and secondary loan sales 
market, where selling banks or borrowers sale loan contracts through syndications, or directly 
to purchasers. We hardly see loan price investigation in the secondary loan sale market, our 
paper is one of the earliest one researches on the price of loan sale. According to Demsetz 
(2000), there are two main hypothetical theories in explaining the loan sale purchasing, 
comparative advantage and diversification hypothesis, for example, banks with advantages in 
originating loans more likely sell and banks with lack of abilities in diversifying loan 
portfolio buy, our evidences support these two main streams. As a typical credit shifting 
approaches, unlike the securitization, loan sale has no need to create new security. Loan sales 
and syndications allow a bank to sell off long-term loan assets from its balance sheet and 
generate short-term capital that bank re-invests in other investment opportunities. Bank loans 
have been circulated in the second market for almost three decades, the loan trading provides 
positive liquidity when the bank sector entirely desires credit transaction (Allen and Carletti, 
2005).   
1. Loan Sales Literature 
Pennacchi (1988) is one of the earlier papers to put forward a theoretical framework for a 
financial firm and shows that loan sales can provide a lower cost of financing loans for the 
selling banks in a competitive deposit market. Borrowers might not like to see the loan sale 
unless they receive a portion of interest rate reduction, the loan origination banks save the 
cost of on balance sheet funding and obtain the benefit of increasing return on assets and 
equity, on another hand, the buyers receive more market exposure and potential gains (Gorton 
and Haubrich, 1990). Seller banks take the advantages via loan sale in various ways, for 
example, the transformation of credit risk rebalances capital structure on both side of buyer 
and seller, also, the active buyers and seller are more likely experiencing higher profits 
(Froot, Kenneth, and Stein, 1998).  
Becketti & Morris (1987) analyze the increased interest in loans sales in late 1980’s as 
Government National Mortgage Association started pooling mortgage loans and started 
selling loan portfolios, that followed with banks pooling their automobile loans, credit card 
and lease receivables, agricultural loans, and even pools of charged-off loans. Becketti & 
Morris (1987) find that increase of loan sales does not reduce the safety and soundness of 
banks; loan sales can be used as a tool for short-term credit and they can enhance smoother 
functioning of short-term credit market. The loan-related private information is a very 
sensitive topic in the transaction, in particular, the purchasing processes are involved many 
conditional agreements. Carlstrom and Sarnolyk (1995) point out that information 
asymmetries exist in the loan sale transaction and relatively facilitate the market. Moreover, 
the sale of loan indirectlly affect the underlying borrowers. Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) 
document that the stock return of underlying borrowers is negatively related around the 







Demsetz (1993) finds that banks engage in loan sales transactions and loan syndications 
for several purposes: a) Leverage (acquisitions, Leverage Buyout LBO, recapitalization), b) 
Debt repayment, c) Specialty finance, and d) General Purposes. Economic conditions play 
critical role in loan sales market. Loan sales by second-tier banks peaked from 1986 through 
the recessions in 1993; but during recessionary period, commercial and industrial loan sale 
origination declines for both second-tier and first-tier banks. Weakness in borrowing 
conditions by corporations also plays a role in lower demand and creation of loan sales in 
post financial crisis period. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) extend from Pennacchi (1988) 
model and present a theoretical model on bank and loan buyer behavior and use large bank 
loan sales data to calibrate their model. They find that if the selling bank gives no guarantees 
on loan sales, the share of loan sold is inversely affected by the spread between loan sales 
yield and the LIBOR. Haubrich and Thomson (1996) analyze the factors that drive some 
banks sale loan sales and other banks purchase loans. They find that discounts on loan sales 
are closely related with commercial papers rate and LIBOR. Loan sales is positively related 
with bank size as measured by total assets, but inversely related with bank’s capital ratio. 
Higher the bank capital ratio, less like is to sell loans. 
Demsetz (2000) finds empirical evidence supporting three alternate hypotheses, a) 
comparative advantage hypothesis: banks with relatively weak ability of originating loans are 
more likely to buy loan deriving from the banks with strong ability of originating loans; and 
b) diversification hypothesis: banks without sufficient opportunity to diversify internally loan 
portfolio are more likely buy loans from the multiple branches banks. c) reputation 
hypothesis: banks with higher reputation and goodwill are more likely participate in the loan 
market. We conjecture that the local banks or saving institutions with limited branches and 
higher business reputation or goodwill are the main buyers in the market. Bedendo and Bruno 
(2009) summarize that banks with more trouble loans portfolio are more likely involved loan 
sale market, also, their evidences support reputational hypothesis and claims that the banks 
size, loan portfolio and profitability can be the factors of loan sale involvement. 
Mokatsanyane, Muzindutsi and Viljoen (2017) indicate that in the south Africa market the 
total size of bank has a significant influence on capitalization. The banks’ branches support 
the geographical diversification for a bank’s multiple-branches in more than one state (Keil 
and Müller, 2020). 
2. Bank Industry Literature 
Several associated issues are originally built in the characteristics of loan sale. For 
instance, the increasing of systematic risk and latent ethics problem, loan sale could be a 
double-edged sword, in the financial pre-crisis period, the accumulated risks wait for a 
breakout, however, for an individual-bank, the stripping disposition positively improves 
balance-sheet performance. Drucker and Puri (2008) find that loan sales contracts contain 
additional restriction covenants for the sellers or the borrowing banks while they perceive the 
existence of agency problems and information asymmetry. In addition, adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems are potentially grievous not only because of declined incentive to 
monitor but also because of systematic risk rising, however, the limitation of loan sale 







Because of credit transfer business, the systematic risk could be raised and the financial 
crisis could be happened. The proponents claim that the business supports the balance sheet 
and improves the buyers and sellers’ liquidity. The loan-sale increases the liquidity of bank 
loan and fosters risk taking in primary markets, whereas the reduction of risky asset 
protectively improves bank’s balance sheet by risk shifting, the improved loan liquidity could 
alleviate banks’ risk (Wagner, 2007). Banks that have better abilities to sell out their risky 
assets are more likely to further hold a large portion of risky asset in their portfolio 
(Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004). Purnanandam (2011) points out that the originate-to-
distribute (OTD) secondary market was involved significantly poor-quality mortgages in the 
pre-financial crisis period. Beyhaghi, Massoud and Saunders (2016) provide evidence that 
banks with capital and liquidity constraints are more likely join in the loan sale secondary 
market.  
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) point out that the new loan to large borrower drop 37% 
at the peak of financial crisis period. Ahn (2010) presents a theoretical model on loan sales in 
a competitive market that shows banks use loan sales as strategic tools to preserve 
informational advantage. Under information asymmetry where buying cannot identify low- 
and high-quality loans, both types of loan sales co-exist, and it eventually leads to growth of 
the loan sales market both in terms of quantity and quality. Chodorow-Reich (2012) clearly 
indicates that a health bank industry contributes a stable financial world and that the bank 
conducting with trouble banks in credit business may more likely has negative consequences. 
Irani and Meisenzahl (2017) document that in the crisis period banks with a heavily reliance 
on loan sale are more likely engage in the secondary market, we extend this issue in our paper 
and investigate  the loan sold-price during the crisis period. By using the euro 
nonperforming loan transaction (NPL) data, Manz, Kiesel and Schiereck (2019) claim that 
the stripping of NPL actually do not provide any significant reduction on financial cost. The 
bank competition and entrepreneur directed search effectively decrease the interest rate on 
loans financed via on-balance-sheet activities, one reason of loan sale is the high competition 
in banking industry (Huang, Li and Sun, 2018).  
Murfin and Petersen (2016) interestingly point the seasonal capital price theory, and 
claim that in the late spring and autumn firms are borrowing a little cheaper and raise 50% 
more funding than the summer and winter. In this paper, we are mainly address the widely 
accepted financial crisis in the history instead of seasonality or periodic problem.  
In summary, the participators in the loan sale market are FDIC-insured banks and saving 
institutions, asset management firms, non-U. S-based banks, and nonbank firms. The business 
may reinforce the systematic risk; however, individual-banks still hold the interest on loan 
sale because of all the benefits. The discount rate could be affected, such as the size of bank 
total asset, commercial & Industrial (C&I) ratio, individual-bank’s characteristic and 
reputation,  combination of bank’s loan portfolio, etc. Two main hypotheses, comparative 
advantage and diversification, explain the nature of loan sale. This research excludes 






















































10. Data and Methodology  
1. Data 
We hand-collect the banks or saving institutions’ financial reports and loan sale data from 
the FDIC official website. For example, we download the distressed loan sale data, then, we 
download and merge the financial reports with each of the corresponding loan sale 
transaction. In addition, Baker at el. (2016) develop an index of economic policy uncertainty 
(EPU), based on the FRED economic data, we deploy an economic policy uncertainty index 
in one of the independent variables. The incorporation of EPU is a way to shed the light on 
basic economic tone. The economic effects directly and indirectly influence the loan sale 
market, the higher risk economy is, the higher index banks face and the higher risk banks 
take, this uncertainty index provides country-wide level risk. For example, the figure 10.3 
and 10.4 in this paper clearly present demonstration. We also see many papers include the 
macro- or micro- economic elements in their paper, one of the most famous paper is Demsetz 
(2000), the cross sectional statewide economic condition is considered as an attribution. 
Finally, we required every loan sale transaction can be traced from the financial report, thus, 
we find out almost three hundred involved-banks (those of banks or saving institution 
participate in distressed loan sale market) in our sample. Our full sample across 27 years and 
16,542 financial institutions.  







Figure 10.4 The Loan Sale Size Changes 
 
2. Methodology 
In this section, we separately explain the independent variable and Left-Hand Side. The 
discounted loan sale rate, a ratio of selling price to book value and our LHS, is our main 
investigation and outcome variable throughout this article. The period of financial crisis 
located on 2008 and 2009, therefore, we create a dummy variable for these two years. Thus, 
we expect the positive and significant discount rate during the financial crisis, 2008-2009. 
The loan-quality and loan-type also affect discounted loan sale rate. Table 11.6 contains the 
color prism in presenting results, the dark green means the highest magnitude and the dark 
red means the lowest magnitude. We control fixed effect on individual, geopolitical state, 
loan type and loan quality. Our research mainly focuses on loan sale transaction in all states 
of the U.S.A. operated by active financial institutions, banks or saving institutions.  
i.  The Bank’s Characteristics  
The natural logarithm of asset in each time period is presented in many investigations, we 
utilize logarithmic asset (in thousand dollar) in the research. Demsetz (2000) claimed that the 
different size of asset provides contributions. We include the goodwill in account, banks’ 






would attract or deter managerial decision in loan sale market, the active participator more 
likely to do the business again. Deposit ratio, a ratio of total deposited to total asset, is an 
important feature of bank loanable asset and also affect the acceptance of discount rate. The 
comparative hypothesis (Demsetz (2000)) claims that the ability of loan origination may 
affects banks’ loan purchasing, more specifically, banks more likely sell loans when they sit 
on plenty of capital, in this article, we expect to see that banks with higher ratio are more 
likely to require a higher discount rate. In addition, deposit ratio is another commonly used 
indicator for analyzing banks’ behavior. Net income impact on the discount rate, many 
researchers include bank profitability in their research for controlling or other purposes, for 
example, Drucker and Puri (2008) indicate that net income-to-Assets as an important 
variable, therefore we here use net income as a control. The dummy variable of interstate 
branch is stmult (A 'yes' or  '1'  indicates that an institution has branches that can accept 
FDIC-insured deposits in more than one state), the findings of Demsetz (2000) present that 
banks with extensive branches and access to diversified loan originations are less likely to 
engage in loan sells or purchases. Moreover, the number of offices owned by the bank is 
num_office, the diversification hypothesis predicts that banks with limited opportunities for 
diversified originations (attribute to size or limitations on geographical expansion) are most 
likely to participate in the secondary market.  
ii. The Bank Loans’ Relevant Ratio 
The sale ratio, a ratio of loan held for sale to asset, could impact the discounted rate of 
loan sale, because the participation in the secondary loan sale market was embodied by the 
ratio. the non-performing loan ratio, a ratio of C&I loans in nonaccrual status plus C&I 
passed due 90+ days over the total asset, could affect managerial decision to meet the 
relevant financial achievements, moreover, the net charge-off  works in the same logic and 
provide impaction on loan sale discount. Demsetz (2000) contains net charge-off ratio and 
non-performing loan ratio for explaining participation on the market, we use them for same 
purposes that these two ratios may prevent/force banks from the secondary market. More 
specifically, if a bank has observable bad loans in the first place, manager may focus on the 
discount rate. For measuring the funding constraints, we follow the most commonly used hot 
funds ratio (Hot_fund) which is the sum of brokered deposits, uninsured deposits and federal 
funds purchased, divided by assets. 
iii. The Differences in Banks’ Loan Type 
We create some variables in the table 11.8 regression. The ratio of 1 – 4 family loan to 
total asset, rfamily_loan, the ratio of real estate loan to total asset, rreal_ratio, the credit 
card loan, rcredit_laon and farmland ratio, rfarm_loan. These ratios provide cross-sectional 
explanatory power on the discount loan-sale rate. Because the book value of each loan sale 
transaction may also affect the loan sale rate, we included, rindivial_loan, the ratio of 
individual loan to total asset. Because individual bank has the different structure of loan type, 
we assume that banks’ loan structure tribute to some weights on loan-purchasing transaction. 
Managers or insiders detailly understand their bank’s loan portfolios, thus the loan purchasing 






main sources of loan portfolio are family loan (rfamily_loan), commercial and industrial loan 
(C&I), real estate loan (rreal_ratio), credit card loan, individual loan and farmland loan. Thus, 
to clearly understand the mechanism of discount rate, we add in banks’ loan portfolio when 
we analyze the impaction of discount rate in loan type. In summary, the application of bank 
characteristics, bank loans’ relevant ratio and the differences in banks’ loan type variables 
could be the typical controls in the loan sale area, thus, in table 11.8, we include the loan 
portfolio ratios in the research. 
3.  Hypotheses Development and Modeling 
Existing literature on loan sales also find that asset quality of loan sales determines their 
discount rates. While the investors or buyers in a structured loan sales or purchases get the 
opportunity to conduct proper due diligence, investors in a failed bank loan sales contract 
have limited access to do the same. Although the FDIC closes the failed banks and channels 
the loan contracts after doing due diligence, FDIC does not provide any guarantee on the 
quality of the loan. However, FDIC discloses ranking of asset quality for the loan contracts 
under the auctions. We argue that FDIC disclosed asset quality classification may affect the 
discount rates across the loan contracts. 
Hypothesis 1: failed bank loan sales are discounted different rates based on disclosed asset quality 
rankings. 
Becketti & Morris (1987) investigate loan sales across various industries and find that 
loan sales in different industries are discounted at different rates.  
Hypothesis 2: Failed bank loan sales are discounted different rates across different industry 
classifications. 
Demsetz (1993) identify that valuations of loan sales can vary during economic 
conditions. However, they do not analyze distress loan sales or failed bank loan sales. We 
argue that FDIC failed bank loan sales are affected by economic conditions, and discounts 
vary during recessionary periods and regular financial conditions. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize,  
Hypothesis 3: Economic conditions affect loan sales, and failed bank loan sales during financial 
downturn are discounted at a higher rate. 
For understanding the hypothesis 1, we include the equation 2 to 5 as the approval. The 
equation 1 is the composition of control variables. We use variables between b1 and b14  
(coefficients of each control) as the controls in order to certify hypo 1 (Eq2 ~ Eq5) and apply 
the entire eq 1 to approve hypo 2 (Eq6 ~ Eq9). In addition, the hypothesis 3 is clarified in 
both Eq2~Eq5 and Eq6~Eq12. We expect to see the negative sign on b12 and b13 because 
they have more sources to originate funds and relatively less concern about the diversification 
issues. Thus, they may more likely buy small discounted product (good quality and higher 






to manage the risk fund and better risk tolerance. 
X = b1· sale_ratioi,t + b2· net_charge-offi,t + b3· Gaini,t  +  b4· Log_net_incomei,t                                  
+ b5·non_performing_ratioi,t + b6·depoist_ratioi,t + b7·hot_fundi,t + b8·goodwilli,t + b9· log_uncertaintiy i,t + 
b10· log-asseti,t + b11· Year Dummy + b12·STMULT + b13· num_office i,t + b14· STMULT · num_office i,t   + 
b15· family_loan_ratioi,t      +  b16· individual_loan_ratioi,t    + b17· real_estate_ratioi,t   + 
b18· credit_card_loan_ratioi,t                                                          Eq(1)                                                                                        
Discount rateit = a0 + C0·YEAR + C1·non-performingi, t + X + FE + εi,t                          Eq(2)                                        
Discount rateit = a1 +D0·YEAR+D1·performing/nonperformingi, t+ X + FE+ εi,t                   Eq(3)                       
Discount rateit = a2 + E0·YEAR + E1·performingi, t + X + FE + εi,t                             Eq(4)                                        
Discount rateit = a3 + F0·YEAR + F1· sub-performingi, t + X + FE + εi,t                         Eq(5)                                      
X is a control variable composition, because our dataset is a panel data, thus, for 
example, Sale_ratioi,t , a ratio of loans held for sale over the total asset “i” at month “t”. εi,t 
represents error term. We conjecture that C0 to F0 have a strongly positive sign ( + ) due to 
the fact that financial crisis may push up the loan sale discount rate. More importantly, the 
non-performing loan quality may provide more budget space for buyers in the negotiation, we 
expect that C1 should have a strong positive sign ( + ) implying the non-performing loan 
positively impacts on the discount rate. In addition, the performing loan attracts qualifies 
buyers, thus, the good quality may drop down the discount significantly, we expect that E1 
should have a negative sign ( - ). Moreover, the second-best quality loan (sub-performing) 
may provide a positive sign ( + ), the sign of performing/nonperforming is unpredictable 
because of the undefined quality. 
For testifying the hypothesis 2, we include the equation 6 to 12 as the approval. For 
understanding the loan portfolio effect in loan purchasing, we further add several controls in 
the equation 1, such as family loan ratio, individual loan ratio, real estate loan ratio credit 
card loan ratio. 
Discount rateit = a4 + G0·YEAR + G1·Bank_Chargeoffi, t + X + FE + εi,t                         Eq(6)                                         
Discount rateit = a5 +H0·YEAR+H1·Commeriali, t+ X + FE+ εi,t                               Eq(7)                                          
Discount rateit = a6 + I0·YEAR + I1·Installmenti, t + X + FE + εi,t                              Eq(8)                                          
Discount rateit = a7 + J0·YEAR + J1· Mixedi, t + X + FE + εi,t                                 Eq(9)                                          
Discount rateit = a8 +K0·YEAR+K1·Otheri, t+ X + FE+ εi,t                                   Eq(10)                                                       
Discount rateit = a9+L0·YEAR+ L1·RE\comerciali, t + X + FE + εi,t                            Eq(11)                                      






We exclude three loan type from our sample because of insufficient observations, such as 
student, deficiency, and ORE Participation. The financial crisis may lifts up the discount rate 
for promotional sale, we anticipate positive from G0 to M0 ( + ). The bank charge-off 
indicates that a delinquent asset of highly unlikely will be collected, we conjecture that this 
type of loan could lift up the discount rate, we might have a positive G1 ( + ). The 
complicated part is that the asset quality is unambiguous and predetermined, in the reality, 
good quality products always require the customer to pay more money, in the loan sale 
market, buyers also need to pay more because of FDIC-predetermined loans’ good quality. 
However, the limitation of our research is that we cannot detail the purchasing motivation 
behind the selection of loan-classification, moreover, buyers may not easily distinguish the 
good or bad type. It is like a customer standing in front of a bunch of unknown fruit, he/her 
does not know which one is sweet or sour, thus, the best scenario for him/her is buying a mix-
bag. Therefore, we might expect that the mix-type decline the discount rate, the J1 should be 
negative ( - ). 
4. Descriptive methodology 
We separately analyze data in several ways and present the description on tables as the 
following statement. Table 11.6 is a variable analysis, Table 11.7 and 11.8 are regression 
results. 
HHI of loan type or hhi_loan, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a general 
measurement of market concentration and has been used to determine market 
competitiveness, we applied this variable in our analysis even though this one does not 
predict anything. However, for understanding the basic framework of a bank’s loan type 
concentration, we simply calculate the HHI at each time period and conjecture the effective 
impaction on purchasing distressed loan sale. The components of calculating HHI here are, 
such as, residential 1-4 family construction, commercial and industrial loans, individual loan, 
and real-estate loan, etc., all of them are the main parts for an individual bank. The HHI is a 
resort for measuring concentrations. We use HHI as a resort for measuring individual bank’s 
loan type concentrations, and might have some good findings crossing before, during, and 
after the loan purchasing. Moreover, for various reasons, banks deploy their loan-type 
demand and anticipate benefits form loan purchasing. Berger and Udell (1993), Demsetz 
(2000) provoke a very interesting description of the participation in loan sale secondary 
market. banks whose portfolios are concentration in other loan types are less likely to 
participate in secondary market, therefore, we would like to ask another question: Is there any 
change across concentration of banks’ loan portfolio?  
In table 11.6, we ranked all the variables into 10 equal size quantiles (1 is the smallest 
quantile and 10 is the highest quantile) and separate them into two groups (loan sale buyer 
and non-buyer). The purpose of table 11.6 is asking a question: is there any relevant 
increasing/decreasing relationship among the number of loan buyers-bank? Include means 
that these banks are loan-buyers in our sample and Exclude means that these banks are not 
loan buyers in our sample. For example, in the interstate branches panel, there are 16,114 






there are 281 banks involved in the loan purchasing and do not have interstate branches, 
moreover, there are only 4 banks involved the loan purchasing and do have some interstate 
branches. Therefore, these evidences strongly support the comparative hypothesis that banks 
without strength funding constraints and loan origination are more likely involve in the loan 
sale secondary market. 
Figure 10.3 and 10.4 present the distribution of distressed loan sale from December 1994 
to June 2019, we believe that the waves of financial crisis need time to hit the beach, 
therefore, the strongest spike is around 2009. The only difference between Figure 10.3 and 
10.4 is that we include all the financial institutions in Figure 10.4. Moreover, Table 11.9 show 
us that the number of loan sale transaction across years. 
Table 11.10 summarizes discount rate across the distressed loan quality and loan type. 
Non-surprisingly, the highest discount rate column is the Non-Performing loan sale. we also 
found out that some of the categories may not have sufficient observation in regression, thus 
we did not contain them in the analysis.  
Bank needs profits and shareholder even needs more profits, thus it’s asking question 
related to the profit, we have several options in our data such as ROA, ROE, net income, and 
the most important one which is the gains form the loan sale transaction. Table 11.12 is a 
summary of changes from purchasing loan sale. Simply, we marked the present-time of 
purchasing loan sale as zero, 0, we marked before-time of purchasing loan sale as negative 1 
to 12, -1 ~ -12, and we also marked after-time of purchasing loan sale as positive 1 to 12, 1 ~ 
12. We conjecture that ROA (roaa), ROE (roee) and HHI (hhi_loan), etc., could be changed 
due to the purchasing, at least, there should have something changed because of the loan 
purchasing. Surprisingly, we found some interesting patterns. Almost all of the variables 
(without capital ratio, actually I use it as the comparative group for verifying the others) 
reached the peak at purchasing time and bank to normal as after-time. The main investigation 
in this ranking is to find out the variable changes in the time-line.  
Table 11.11 is a summary of discount rate in 10 (1 is the smallest quantile and 10 is the 
highest quantile) different quantiles of 10 different variables. There are some interesting 
uptrend and downtrend in this table. we ask one question here: Does the different size of asset 
(for example, we rank loan-sale-involved-banks into 10 equal segments) reflect any higher or 
lower loan sale discount?  we can see that the higher the asset quantiles (the highest in 3th 
quintile), the lower the discount rate, thus, we pre-conclude that banks with larger asset more 
likely acquire a lower discount rate (many reasons here, for example, they only buy good 












11. Empirical results  
This section provides explanations to tables and figure. Paragraphs follow the order of 
tables and figures.  
Table 11.5 Summary Statistics 
     Mean   St.Dev   max   min   skewness   kurtosis 
 Discount rate .471 .298 .99 -.025 .081 1.784 
 HHI loan .532 .425 5.332 0 1.363 5.187 
 Sale ratio .006 .041 3.607 0 15.298 340.955 
 Netcharge off ratio .001 .009 5.778 -1.076 280.402 133000 
 Gain ratio 4.272 2.254 14.898 0 .335 3.162 
 NetIncome(in thousand $) 7494.729 178000 2.92e+07 -2.46e+07 56.624 7058.834 
 Nonperforming loans ratio -7.297 1.78 -1.125 -17.455 -.415 3.02 
 Deposit ratio  .826 .115 5.143 0 -3.676 26.683 
 Hot funds .162 .161 60.384 -2.555 104.331 37690.39 
 Goodwill .003 .015 .777 0 20.171 682.154 
 Uncertainty Index 103.573 32.782 245.127 57.203 1.193 4.134 
 Asset (in thousand $) 1220000 2.45e+07 2.35e+09 1 57.895 3887.858 
 Num of office 10.115 95.368 6730 0 41.97 2216.129 
The discount rate mean is around 50% indicating the loan price cut is pretty common in 
the loan sale secondary market. Moreover, the minimum is negative implying in some 
transactions buyers are willing to purchase loans in a premium price. The mean of  HHI loan 
is around 0.5, skewness and kurtosis are 1.4 and 5.2, respectively. The minimum of sale ratio 
is zero because some buyers do not hold any loans to sale. Nonperforming loans ratio equals 
to a ratio of C&I loans in nonaccrual status plus C&I passed due 90+ days over the total 
asset. The mean of deposit ratio is 82.6% implying most of FDIC-insured financial 
institutions are depository orientation. The Quarterly Uncertainty Economics Index directly 
comes from the FRED. Banks assets is in thousands of dollars. We see that the minimum 
number of offices is zero indicating some of the financial institutions do not have more than 
one office in U.S. market. 
Table 11.6 The Overview of Banks’ Characteristic  
Note: % means item of included divide item of included. 
P1: The Number of Banks in 6 Quantiles of number of offices P2: Interstate Branches 
  1 2 3 4 5 6   NO YES Total 
Excluded 7,270 236 2,874 1,720 2,190 1,967 Excluded 16,114 143 16,257 
Included 139 9 37 23 27 50 Included 281 4 285 
% 1.91% 3.81% 1.29% 1.34% 1.23% 2.54% Total 16,395 147 16,542 







At the table 11.6, we can see some features from the loan buyer in the secondary market. 
For example, Table 11.6 presents valuable results to understand the relevant features of buyer 
P3: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of Asset 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 3,243 1,626 1,496 1,408 1,424 1,408 1,397 1,405 1,408 1,442 
Included 90 27 16 17 16 13 29 19 26 32 
% 2.78% 1.66% 1.07% 1.21% 1.12% 0.92% 2.08% 1.35% 1.85% 2.22% 
P4: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of ROA 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 3,643 1,462 1,404 1,384 1,379 1,375 1,383 1,386 1,385 1,387 
Included 98 17 17 23 22 21 22 13 17 34 
% 2.69% 1.16% 1.21% 1.66% 1.60% 1.53% 1.59% 0.94% 1.23% 2.45% 
P5: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of Goodwill 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 369 394 387 371 340 349 324 336 332 348 
Included 7 7 7 6 5 4 10 4 11 7 
% 1.90% 1.78% 1.81% 1.62% 1.47% 1.15% 3.09% 1.19% 3.31% 2.01% 
P6: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of C&I /asset ratio 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 2,330 1,751 1,600 1,534 1,508 1,499 1,499 1,479 1,499 1,558 
Included 40 47 27 21 22 26 25 22 28 27 
% 1.72% 2.68% 1.69% 1.37% 1.46% 1.73% 1.67% 1.49% 1.87% 1.73% 
P7: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of net charge off ratio 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 1,486 2,717 2,219 1,427 1,391 1,390 1,382 1,387 1,392 1,426 
Included 23 71 51 13 21 24 25 20 20 17 
% 1.55% 2.61% 2.30% 0.91% 1.51% 1.73% 1.81% 1.44% 1.44% 1.19% 
P8: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of nonperforming loans ratio 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 915 922 925 926 918 919 924 927 918 921 
Included 23 12 10 11 16 13 11 14 14 18 
% 2.51% 1.30% 1.08% 1.19% 1.74% 1.41% 1.19% 1.51% 1.53% 1.95% 
P9: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of Deposit Ratio 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 3,503 1,494 1,436 1,414 1,400 1,407 1,402 1,393 1,399 1,409 
Included 110 20 21 17 17 14 25 28 18 15 
% 3.14% 1.34% 1.46% 1.20% 1.21% 1.00% 1.78% 2.01% 1.29% 1.06% 
P10: The Number of Banks in 10 Quantiles of 1 -4 family loan ratio 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Excluded 2,984 1,650 1,521 1,486 1,438 1,423 1,422 1,431 1,428 1,434 
Included 79 34 24 21 25 25 23 19 18 17 






bank. Panel 1 (P1) indicate that the second lowest quartile of number of bank owned office 
has the highest volume, thus, bank with limited number of office more likely involved in the 
market, we confirm this evidence by the panel 2 (P2) due to the fact that 281 banks or saving 
associations involved in the market more likely participate in the loan sale secondary market. 
those of having limited interstate branch, this evidence supports the diversification hypothesis 
that banks without extensive branches more likely step in the loan sale market. Based on the 
whole sample size, banks involved in the loan sale market are predictively and majorly local-
based reputational financial institutions, according to the Demsetz (2000), banks may be not 
allowed get in the market because of the reputational barriers, in our paper, the FIs with 
relative high reputation are more likely purchase loans from the counterpart. We have a 
conclusion from the panels from 4 to 10 that these FIs present very small ratios because of 
the property of local-based bank. Our research evidences support the comparative hypothesis 
that banks with less lending and loan origination opportunities are more likely involved in the 
buyer group of loan sale secondary market. Panel 3 (P3) show that the group of banks with 
lowest asset (some high asset quantile also joins the part) more likely step in the secondary 
market. P7 indicate that bank with lower net charge off ratio more likely involve in the 
market, meanwhile, P8, the ratio of non-performing loan support our panel seven. Panel 10 
provides an interesting pattern on 1 - 4 family loan, the downtrend implies that banks with 
smallest ratio of family over asset are more likely involved in the sale market. We also found 
out that most of the banks or saving associations eventually were merged by other banks or 
were name-changed for some reasons. The dominant component of the buyers in the 
distressed loan sale market is the group of local banks whose have good reputation, lower 
non-performing ratio, higher capital ratio (total risk-based capital ratio) and lowest net 
charge-off ratio.  
Table 11.7 The Empirical Result of Loan Quality 
The Target Variable is Loan-Quality and The Dependent Variable is Discount rate 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Non-Perfor~g Perform/No~f Performing Sub-Perfor~g 
hhi loan -0.130 -0.0990 -0.184 -0.119 
  (-1.41) (-0.93) (-1.73) (-1.08) 
sale ratio 2.889 1.841 3.184 2.045 
  (1.41) (0.87) (1.46) (1.00) 
netcharge ~f -4.073 -2.003 -3.563 -2.012 
  (-1.51) (-0.66) (-1.35) (-0.67) 
Gain 0.0250 0.036* 0.026* 0.036* 
  (2.02) (2.52) (2.28) (2.69) 
log netinc~e 0.0110 0.0270 0.022* 0.0290 
  (1.09) (1.50) (2.57) (1.78) 
 






nonperform~s 0.0160 0.0180 0.0140 0.0180 
  (0.98) (1.02) (0.66) (0.94) 
deposit ra~m 0.922*** 0.824*** 0.932*** 0.843*** 
  (6.54) (4.75) (6.36) (4.84) 
Hot funds -0.168 -0.0850 -0.130 -0.0800 
  (-1.87) (-0.77) (-1.19) (-0.64) 
Goodwill -0.743 0.534 1.613 1.279 
  (-0.24) (0.19) (0.47) (0.40) 
log uncert~y 0.114 0.185* 0.0880 0.169* 
  (1.68) (2.45) (1.44) (2.44) 
log asset 0.00800 0.0390 -0.00500 0.0340 
  (0.20) (1.08) (-0.13) (1.01) 
1.year 0.227*** 0.219*** 0.222** 0.218*** 
  (5.26) (7.83) (4.30) (6.63) 
1.stmult -0.188 -0.188 -0.140 -0.164 
  (-1.95) (-1.75) (-1.08) (-1.40) 
num office -0.0420 -0.060** -0.0380 -0.057* 
  (-1.99) (-3.13) (-1.64) (-2.94) 
1.stmult#c~e 0.045* 0.055** 0.0390 0.052* 
  (2.43) (3.10) (1.80) (2.84) 
NonPerf 0.236***       
  (8.69)       
Perf Nonperf   -0.0810     
    (-1.01)     
Perf     -0.200***   
      (-8.19)   
Sub Perf       0.084* 
        (2.45) 
cons -0.813 -1.471** -0.431 -1.369** 
  (-1.45) (-3.67) (-0.76) (-3.72) 
r2 within 0.479 0.302 0.447 0.300 
In the table 11.7, the best quality is performing loan (column #3), the second-best quality 
is sub-performing loan (column #4), the third one is the performing/nonperforming loan 
(column #2) and the worst quality is the non-performing loan (column #1). The dummy 
variables are YEAR (1 is year from January 2008 to December 2009, 0 otherwise) and 
STMULT (1 represent banks with interstate branches, 0 otherwise). We apply various fixed 
effect (FE), the individual fixed effect, the geopolitical state and city fixed effect, and loan 
classification fixed effect. The positive gain and deposit ratio support that banks with 
observable profits and high deposit ratio more likely undertake significant loan discounts. 
Unsurprisingly, at the high economic risk, the discount rate could be higher. Moreover, we 
prove our hypothesis 3 that, at the crisis time, discount rate is significantly higher than its’ 






positive non-performing loan and negative performing loan respectively, the good quality 
loan desires higher price instead of lower price and the no-good quality loan ask higher 
discount instead of lower discount. It is widespread fact because of better quality and high 
price. We conclude that the loan quality does affect the discount rate in the market. The 
interestingly evidence is that the sub-performing loan sells at a small discount rate. In 
addition, because of the negative and significant sign on dummy interstate and number of 
offices, our evidences support that banks with more than one branches are more likely 
purchase less discounted loans, because they have multiple sources to originate funds and 
relatively less concern about the diversification issues. Thus, they may more likely buy small 
discounted product (good quality and higher price). The positive interaction term because 
buyers with interstate offices have better abilities to manage the risk fund and better risk 
tolerance. 
Table 11.8 The Empirical Result of Loan Classification 
The Target Variable is Loan-Type and The Dependent Variable is Discount rate 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  BankCharge~f Commer Installment Mixed Other RECommer REResi 
rfamily loan -0.414 -0.423* -0.467 -0.429* -0.394 -0.477* -0.456 
  (-2.12) (-2.26) (-2.08) (-2.23) (-2.10) (-2.57) (-1.96) 
rindivi loan 1.081* 1.135* 0.956* 1.124* 1.091* 1.210* 1.064* 
  (2.31) (2.42) (2.50) (2.43) (2.34) (2.64) (2.60) 
rreal ratio 0.0560 0.0870 0.0960 0.0860 0.0670 0.119 0.0940 
  (0.24) (0.38) (0.40) (0.38) (0.30) (0.52) (0.39) 
rcredit laon -2.204 -1.771 -2.064 -2.318 -3.105 -1.976 -3.386 
  (-0.56) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.60) (-0.80) (-0.56) (-1.10) 
sale ratio 4.930* 4.259 4.574* 4.727* 4.561* 4.602* 4.550* 
  (2.61) (1.73) (2.58) (2.27) (2.30) (2.30) (2.30) 
netcharge ~f -1.679 -0.702 -2.183 -1.794 -1.540 -0.544 -1.599 
  (-0.49) (-0.24) (-0.61) (-0.53) (-0.45) (-0.18) (-0.45) 
Gain 0.0160 0.0180 0.0170 0.0140 0.0140 0.0170 0.0140 
  (1.05) (1.07) (1.21) (0.97) (0.86) (1.03) (0.86) 
log netinc~e 0.0130 0.00500 0.0130 0.0110 0.0130 0.00400 0.0120 
  (1.61) (0.72) (1.14) (1.44) (1.63) (0.47) (1.41) 
nonperform~s 0.0110 0.0100 0.0100 0.00900 0.00900 0.00900 0.00700 
  (0.50) (0.45) (0.49) (0.37) (0.38) (0.36) (0.33) 
deposit ra~m 0.894** 0.943** 0.865** 0.885** 0.905** 0.910** 0.864** 
  (3.87) (4.07) (4.07) (3.86) (4.00) (3.92) (3.61) 
Hot funds -0.222 -0.278 -0.195 -0.225 -0.235 -0.258 -0.209 
  (-1.47) (-2.14) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-1.49) (-2.01) (-1.56) 
 






Goodwill 2.444 1.960 2.508 2.638 2.755 2.554 3.057 
  (0.75) (0.68) (0.99) (0.83) (0.86) (0.75) (1.05) 
log uncert~y 0.0600 0.108 0.0510 0.0620 0.0600 0.0880 0.0440 
  (0.72) (1.21) (0.63) (0.74) (0.72) (0.99) (0.54) 
log asset 0.0170 0.0350 0.0110 0.0200 0.0160 0.0370 0.0100 
  (0.21) (0.47) (0.15) (0.24) (0.20) (0.49) (0.14) 
1.year 0.242*** 0.247*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.239*** 0.236*** 
  (7.28) (8.00) (7.01) (7.18) (7.22) (7.44) (6.52) 
1.stmult -0.199* -0.220* -0.213** -0.214* -0.214* -0.212* -0.203* 
  (-2.46) (-2.64) (-3.16) (-2.63) (-2.61) (-2.46) (-2.42) 
num office -0.051* -0.058* -0.054** -0.054* -0.055* -0.058* -0.054* 
  (-2.39) (-2.63) (-3.35) (-2.49) (-2.48) (-2.36) (-2.37) 
1.stmult#c~e 0.055* 0.062** 0.058** 0.059** 0.059** 0.061* 0.057* 
  (3.03) (3.25) (4.31) (3.14) (3.14) (2.93) (2.99) 
Bank Charg~f 0.201*             
  (2.25)             
Commercial   -0.0540           
    (-0.90)           
Installment     0.173         
      (1.83)         
Mixed       -0.286***       
        (-8.92)       
Other         0.0370     
          (0.77)     
RECommercial           0.0520   
            (1.22)   
REResident~l             -0.0460 
              (-1.51) 
cons -0.628 -1.017 -0.504 -0.654 -0.609 -0.965 -0.438 
  (-0.47) (-0.81) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.46) (-0.75) (-0.36) 
r2 within 0.370 0.373 0.382 0.375 0.367 0.372 0.370 
In the table 11.8, we divide seven industry classification in order to approve the 
impaction on discount rate. The bank charge off model is the first column, the second column 
is commercial loan, the third one is installment, the fourth column is mixed loan type, other is 
in the fifth column, the real estate backup commercial and residential loan present in six and 
seven columns, respectively. Table 11.8 explains almost same result; however, we exclude the 
HHI of loan type in each regression for reducing the collinearity and contain four major loan 
types in each column. We control the loan quality fixed effect. Interestingly, we find out that 
banks with high weight on family loan more likely undertake the low discount loan because 
of the significant negative sign on type of family, also, because of the positive significant sign 
on sale ratio, banks with relatively high loan-hold-for-sale are more likely undertake higher 






hypothesis 3 that, at the crisis time, discount rate is significantly higher than its normal time. 
Interactional variable of office number and hold/not-hold interstate branches indicates that 
banks with multi- and interstate- branches more likely undertake higher discount rate. Both 
negative sign in front of number of office and hold interstate branches showing on table 11.7 
and 11.8 imply that banks with interstate branches and more offices intend to take low 
discount loan. The most important approval is that the industry classification provides a little 
different loan discount across all columns. There is a significant evidence, the loading of 
bank charge-off and mixed type loan indicates that the bank charge-off loan provides more 
discount and mixed type loan actually declines discount rate. Because the mix-big is better 
off, We reclaim that the insignificant of other industrial classifications is because we do not 
have specific confidential combination and contract convent on those loans, therefore, there is 
no enough information to analyze these classifications. We believe that the loan quality 
clearly guides buyers’ decision because of the predetermined rank, and that the industrial 
classification may relatively has limit power on buyers’ decision unless they intentionally 
focus on a certain type. 
The commercial loan may include different nature; hence it is hard to define the 
coefficient H1. If borrowers make the payment one time, we also cannot get a clear sign on 
I1. We are actually surprised by the negative J1, the confidential agreement makes 
researchers so hard to predict the composition of mixed loan. Eventually, we arbitrary say 
that this type contains some outperformance loans. We also cannot have the properties of 
“other loan”, it is an undefined K1, again this type may include good/bad loans. Normally, we 
should have negative sign both on L1 and M1, however, the loan type of real estate backup 
commercial shows us nothing important, the M1 almost present significant impaction on 
discount rate. There are some limitations in our research, first, because of the confidential 
agreement (Loan Maturity, the status of bank holding companies, the composition of 
purchasing loan, etc.), it’s very hard to predict the nature of underlying loan portfolios, 
second, we find out that buyer FIs was acquired, merged or renamed after the purchase, thus, 
the M&A data could be the crucial role in our research. 
Figure 1 clear indicate that the highest amount of loan sale is around August 2009 and the 
uptrend of the loan sale emerges around 2008. It takes one year to reach the peak of loan sale; 
we can see a steep climbing around 2008 and 2009. in addition, this climbing shows us the 
strength of financial crisis. Figure 2, the discount rate of loan sale reach to the highest around 
2009, thus, we confirm the regression result in table 11.7 and 11.8. The overlap of total size 
of loan sale book value (thick red line) and the total size of loan sale trade price/selling price 
(thin green line) clearly present the mechanism which the remarkable discounted behavior 
also presents on around August 2009. For better understanding the numeric pattern, table 11.9 
numerically translates the evidence of figure 10.3 into numeric table. Both figure 10.3 and 









Table 11.9 Number Transaction of Loan Sale 
Number Transaction of Loan Sale  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13 14 15 16 21 34 51 83 
 Year                    
1994 5   8                    
1995 2 14 25 5                    
1996 5 5 8 10 11   11                
1997 17 3 8 13  26                  
1998 1 5 25 11                    
1999 1  3 8                    
2000 9 6 16                     
2001 6 11                      
2002 4 27 6                     
2003 1 6                      
2004 3 2 3                     
2005 2                       
2007 1                       
2008 2 2 14 5 8                   
2009    4   53 30 14   27  62  77 128 239 
2010   3 5 11  22 25 22 14 28  24  67         
2011 4   9    16 22 21              
2012 2 4 8 7   15 14                
2013  2 3 8   22                 
2014 1 5 3 17  9                  
2015 6                       
2016 2  4                     
2017 7                       
2018 2                                       
For better understanding and visualizing the interaction between the loan quality and 
classification on discount rate, in the table 11.10, the most price-cut loan quality in all aspect 
is the non-performing column because no matter in which row the highest discount rate 
always locate in nonperforming column. Table 11.12 is a summary of quarterly changes from 
purchasing loan sale. Simply, we marked the present-time of purchasing loan sale as zero, 0, 
we marked before-time of purchasing loan sale as negative 1 to 12, -1 ~ -12, and we also 
marked after-time of purchasing loan sale as positive 1 to 12, 1 ~ 12. We conjecture that ROA 
(roaa), ROE (roee) and HHI (hhi_loan), etc., could be changed due to the purchasing, at least, 
there should have something changed because of the loan purchasing. Surprisingly, we found 
some interest patterns. Almost all of the variables (without capital ratio, actually we use it as 
the comparative group for verifying the others) reached the peak at purchasing time and back 
to normal after-purchasing. The main investigation in this ranking is to find out the variable 
change in the time-line. Bank needs profits and shareholder even needs more profits, thus it’s 
logically to ask question related to the profit, we have several options in our data such as 







Table 11.10 Discounted Rate Across Loan-Quality and Loan-Type 
Discounted Rate Across Loan-Quality and Loan-Type 
All in % Quality 
Loan Type Mixed Non-Performing Perform/Nonperf Performing Sub-Performing 
         
Bank Charge Off   88     
Commercial   73 59 4 35 
Consumer   3     
Deficiency Bal   47     
Installment   63 5 23 39 
Judgment   79     
Mixed   74 55 6 0 
ORE Participation   68     
Other   55 2 16 3 
RE\Commercial   64 49 26 22 
RE\Residential 57 45 35 21 16 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11.11, we separately describe the relevant variables in 10 equal-size quantiles for 
capturing detailed common features. For example, there is a downtrend in the net income 
column, indicating the less profitable bank has the better interest to hold lower discount rate. 
There is an uptrend in the net charge off ratio, indicating banks or saving institutions with 
higher net charge-off ratio undertake higher discount rate. Unfortunately,  most of volume 
does not provide any clear increasing or decreasing pattern.  
Table 11.13 The Benefit of Loan Sale 
Dependent variable is ROA 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  before mark after 
log asset -0.0970 -0.102 -0.0990 
  (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.30) 
hhi loan 0.766*** 0.809** 0.725** 
  (3.35) (3.26) (3.07) 
Gain 0.077* 0.0640 0.083* 
  (2.06) (1.64) (2.25) 
capital ra~o 6.331 6.141 6.303 
  (1.55) (1.52) (1.55) 
1.buybe -0.731***     
  (-5.34)     
1.Buy Mark   0.103   
    (0.15)   
1.buyaf     -0.383*** 
      (-4.05) 
cons 0.697 0.815 0.709 
  (0.69) (0.78) (0.69) 
r2 within 0.0540 0.0320 0.0440 
Table 11.13, we experimentally explore the pattern of bank’s ROA (dependent variable) 
in ex-ante, present and ex-post of loan purchasing. The basic idea here is asking a question: 
Does the loan buyers get any benefit at the loan purchasing period? we arbitrarily involved 
several explicators in regression, such as logarithmic asset, the created HHI loan, loan sale 
gains, FDIC provided capital ratio and dummy time variable in ex-ante, present and ex-post 
of loan purchasing. In all columns, our HHI loan provides significant positive contribution on 
return on asset, indicating the more specific loan type concentration positively affect the 
bank’s return on asset. Moreover, the Gain provides significant positive contribution on ROA 
due to the more benefits from the loan sale gain the higher ROA. The most interesting result 
is the significant negative on buy before and after, implying buyers actually have less 
profitability comparing to the buying period and explaining the potential reason of loan sale 






significant profits at the buying moment but without involvement of loan sale they may have 






























We use FDIC disclosed bank loan sales dataset which comprises of a total of 4273 loan 
sales transactions beginning from 1994 to 2019 and explore four key questions. The dataset 
includes two major financial crises of the recent times, the dot.com bubble of 2001, and the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Loan sales discounts, asset quality, industry 
classifications, compositions and buyers interest vary significantly during financial recessions 
and non-recessionary periods. For example, average discount is higher in recession sample 
54.68% compared to 47.82% in non-recession period. 52.24% loan sales are performing 
during recessionary period compared to 31.86% during non-recessionary sample. In our 
analysis, we include a set of characteristics variables: Bank’s Characteristics, the loans’ 
relevant ratios, banks’ loan type, economic conditions, and control variables.  
First, we investigate asset quality definitions disclosed by FDIC database affect the loan 
sales discounts. Our results suggest that loan sales discount rates are inversely related with 
asset quality. Performing and sub-performing loans on average are sold at less discount 
compared to average loan sale contracts, compared to Performing-non-performing and non-
performing loan that are at higher discount compared to average loan sales.  
Second, we analyze whether the industry classification determines loan sales discount 
rates. Bank charge off loan are sold at significant higher discount compared to average loan 
contract sales. Surprisingly, R.E. commercial and R.E. residential loans are not sold at lower 
discount. However, the mixed type loans are sold at lower discount. For consumer loans and 
other types of loans, their discount rates are not significantly different from average loan sales 
discounts.  
Third, we analyze the impact of financial crisis on loan sales discounts. In our decades 
sample, we create a year dummy between December 2008 and December 2009 and find out 
that the loan sale discount rates in the financial crisis time are significantly higher than its 
normal period. We prove the hypothesis in our two regressions, the evidences are consistent 













Summary of Variable  
Bank Characteristics Variables 
Num. Variable Variable Name Description of Variable Unit Source 





2. Reputation Goodwill Intangible asset  Demsetz(2000) 
3. Gains Gain Logarithmic net gains (losses) 
on sales of loan 
 Irani and 
Meisenzahl 
(2017) 
4. Deposit ratio deposit_ra~m a ratio of total deposited to total 
asset 
 Demsetz(2000) 
5. Dummy of 
Interstate 
branches Yes/No 
stmult A 'yes' or  '1'  indicates that an 
institution has branches that can 
accept FDIC-insured deposits in 
more than one state 
1 or 0 Demsetz(2000) 
6. Number of 
offices 
num_office Total number of offices owned 
by the bank 
  
FDIC Bank Bailout Variables 
Sl. Variable Variable Name Description of Variable Unit Source 
1. Sale ratio sale_ratio A ratio loans held for sale over 
the total asset 
  
2. Net charge-off 
ratio 
netcharge_~f charge-offs minus recoveries, 




nonperform~s a ratio of C&I loans in 
nonaccrual status plus C&I 
passed due 90+ days over the 
total asset 
 Demsetz(2000) 
4. Hot funds Hot_funds the sum of brokered deposits, 
uninsured deposits 
 Demsetz(2000) 
5. Net income log_netinc~e Logarithmic Net Income  Drucker and Puri 
(2008) 











7. real estate loan 
ratio 
rreal_ratio The ratio of real estate loan to 
total asset 
  
8. credit card loan 
ratio 
rcredit_laon The ratio of credit card loan to 
total asset 
  
9. farmland loan 
ratio 
rfarm_loan The ratio of farmland loan to 
total asset 
  
10. individual loan 
ratio 
rindivial_loan The ratio of individual loan to 
total asset 
  
Variables in our research 
Sl. Variable Variable Name Description of Variable Unit Source 
1. Interaction term 




stmult#c~e This is an interaction term of 
dummy interstate and number of 
offices 
  




log_uncert~y The Economic Policy 
Uncertainty Index is based on 
newspapers in the United States. 




Hirschman Index  
of Loan 
hhi_loan The measurement of a bank’s 
loan portfolio concentration. 
  
4. Dummy of year year 1 represents period between 
2008 and 2009, zero otherwise. 
1 or 0  
Note: Most of variables are based on FIDC quarterly financial report database. In addition, we only point out the most typical paper in 
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